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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical analysis on managerial delegation in the oligopoly composed not
only of a private firm that maximizes its own profit but also of a public firm that is a welfare
maximizer. This type of industry is referred to as mixed duopoly. We analyze various competitive
environments in the mixed duopoly where the technologies of both public and private firms are
represented by quadratic cost functions, and attempt to explain the question of whether the en-
dogenous choice of roles played by managerial firms may actually lead to situations in which these
firms move sequentially in the market game.
Today, we observe oligopolistic markets in which private and public firms compete in many
industries across many countries, regardless of the worldwide privatization of public enterprises.
Research on mixed oligopoly has burgeoned since the pioneering paper by ?. In the traditional
analyses on mixed oligopoly similar to them, the structure of market competition is assumed
beforehand, and thus depending on the order of moves based on the assumption, public and private
firms set either output or price. However, it is more realistic to assume that firms not only choose
the necessary actions to be taken but also decide on the time that these actions need to be taken. In
particular, on the case of mixed oligopoly (duopoly), since the sequential or simultaneous order of
firms’ moves may give rise to significantly different results, it is important to investigate the model
in which the time at which output or price should be chosen by each firm is endogenized. ? first
discussed endogenous timing in mixed markets using the observable delay game of ?, wherein each
firm chooses the time to take necessary actions before producing and cannot produce over more
than one period. According to ?, private firms take the lead in an equilibrium for the game with
more than two periods; further, in the case of a two-period mixed duopoly, a public firm can be the
leader. ? and ? extended Pal’s seminal work (1998) to consider that the public firm competes with
foreign private firms. Although the three papers mentioned above examine quantity competition,
? analyzed price competition with differentiated goods wherein firms chose to set prices either
sequentially or simultaneously. This paper also focuses on the role of the endogenous timing of
firms’ moves using the observable delay game along the lines of these works.
In the literature on private oligopoly, recent researchers have criticized the view that firms
are entities whose sole objectives are to maximize their own profits. ? and ?, the pioneering
works in this field, explicitly investigated the effects of delegation and distortion of managerial
preferences on the competitive performance on firms. They considered profit maximizing firms
that hire managers who do not maximize profits. Concretely, they explored two-stage duopoly
models where in the first stage, each firm’s owner provides a delegation contract for his or her
manager, which is a linear combination of profits and sales. On the other hand, in the literature
on mixed markets, the analyses on separating the ownership and management within a firm have
become increasingly popular in recent years. ? first modeled the incentive contracts, a` la Fersht-
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man and Judd and Sklivas, into a mixed duopolistic industry. ? solely emphasized the strategic
benefits of managerial incentive contracts, whereas Barros considered both the strategic effects
and asymmetric information. ?, as another recent work in the context of managerial delegation
contracts modeled after contracts proposed by Fershtman and Judd and Sklivas, analyzed the in-
tersection between the length of incentive contracts and market behavior with a two-period mixed
oligopolistic framework. In particular, White considered a two-stage game of mixed oligopoly with
a particular order of exogenous moves wherein managerial incentive parameters were chosen before
making the choice with regard to quantity. More precisely, he investigated that both owners of
firms first choose incentive parameters for their managers simultaneously, and then the managers
simultaneously choose their quantities. In this paper, we basically formulate the model based on
the one suggested in ?. The distinction between our model and his model is that the stage in which
firms’ owners choose the periods of when to set their outputs or prices is added to our model as
the pre-play stage in the observable delay game.
As mentioned above, it is only recently that the topic of how managerial firms can improve their
own objectives began to be seriously considered in the context of managerial incentive contracts.
In particular, for a long time, no attention has been devoted to the question concerning the type of
competition that occurs in the equilibrium when endogenous timing choices made by managerial
firms are taken into account. In the literature on private oligopoly (duopoly), ? first addressed
the issue of timing in a game between managerial firms. He modeled the situation in which
owners provide their managers with incentive contracts that deviate from owners’ objectives, i.e.,
maximizing their own profits, and then the managers choose their outputs or prices in the period
that their corresponding owners announce, using the observable delay game. Just like ?, ? and
? examined quantity competition and price competition, respectively, in the context of mixed
duopoly. In both the papers, it was assumed that technologies of both public and private firms are
represented by constant marginal cost functions.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the results derived in Nakamura and Inoue
(2007b, 2007c) are robust when the cost functions of both the firms are quadratic. Moreover, we
consider various environments in mixed duopoly. To be more precise, we examine the quantity
competition with homogeneous goods under the moderate cost condition and the price and quantity
competitions with differentiated goods under the somewhat specific cost condition. ? obtained
the same result as that in ? in that public and private firms choose quantities sequentially in
equilibrium. Thus, their model had the two equilibria in which the public firm became the leader
or the follower. In contrast, we show that the case in which the public firm is the follower tends
to be a unique equilibrium in the two types of quantity competitions with homogeneous and
differentiated goods when the cost functions of both the firms are symmetric and quadratic. Note
that in the competition with homogeneous goods, the case in which the public firm takes the
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lead can also be an equilibrium if both the public firm and private firm are adequately efficient;
in other words, parameter k (described later) is sufficiently low. In such a case, we find that
there are multiple equilibria, and thus, the result coincides with that in ?. With respect to price
competition, ? showed that both the public firm and the private firm take the action as late as
possible; therefore, in equilibrium, they simultaneously set their prices at the late period. Their
result was strikingly different from that in ? who considered the case in which owners directly
manage their respective firms. In the analysis of the case in which technologies of both the firms
are represented by symmetric and quadratic cost functions, we obtain the same result as that in ?.
Thus, in the mixed duopoly with managerial delegation wherein both the firms choose their prices,
we find that the result of the observable delay game is robust against the change in production
technologies, whereas the result of quantity competition is sensitive to such a change.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the basic setting
on the managerial delegation and the observable delay game of the three types of models considered
in this paper. In Section 3, we consider the case of quantity competition with homogeneous goods
under the weak cost condition. In Section 4, we investigate the two cases of price and quantity
competition with differentiated goods. Section 5 concludes with some remarks.
2 Basic Setting
This paper focuses on the managerial aspects of firms. We consider a well-known principal-agent
framework in which each owner hires a manager. Suppose that each firm comprises an owner and
a manager. Thus, we consider the situation in which the firms’ owners decide to delegate control
over his or her own assets to managers. To formalize managerial delegation, we follow ? and ?.
We assume that the manager of Firm i maximizes the following function Vi(Πi, qi):
Vi(Πi, qi) = Πi + θiqi θi ∈ R, i = 0, 1,
where parameter θi represents the degree of the relevance of sales. In this delegation regime, the
manager of Firm i can maximize his or her payoff by choosing qi that maximizes Vi. This can be
supported by the assumption that the payoff to the manager of Firm i is represented as λi+µiVi for
some real number λi and some positive number µi. This type of delegation scheme functions as a
commitment device, since it is common knowledge before the managers compete against each other.
Similar to most literature on managerial delegation, we assume that the effect of the managers’
payoffs on profits is negligible, since we emphasize the influence of incentive contracts on market
outcomes.
We adopt the observable delay game in the context of a mixed duopoly. The observable delay
game consists of a a pre-play stage and a subsequent mixed duopolistic game. In the pre-play
stage, the firms’ owners simultaneously announce whether their managers will choose their own
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quantities or prices late or early and the managers are committed to the choice before the market
competition stages. After both the owners’ announcements, each manager sets his or her own
quantity or price according to the choice of his or her owner in the pre-play stage, estimating the
time when the opponent will set his or her quantity or price.
Formally, the game runs as follows: Note that only the third stage consists of two periods,
Period 1 and Period 2. In the first stage, Owner i independently chooses ti ∈ {1, 2}, where ti
indicates the time of the third stage at which his or her strategic variables should be set (i = 0, 1).
ti = 1 implies that Firm i’s manager sets his or her quantity or price early, and ti = 2 implies that
he or she sets his or her quantity or price late. In the second stage, after observing the opponent’s
timing decision, Owners 0 and 1 simultaneously set their respective firm’s value of θi. In the third
stage, the manager of Firm i selects his or her quantity or price at Period i that Owner i chooses in
the first stage (i = 0, 1). If both the owners decide to choose the same period, then the simultaneous
competition in quantity or price follows. Otherwise, there occurs the Stackelberg competition in
which the firm having chosen Period 1 becomes the leader. At the end of the game, the market
opens and each firm sells its own product. We adopt a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and
thus, the game is solved backward.
3 Competition with Homogeneous Goods
In this section, we consider the competition with homogeneous goods. The duopolists produce
perfectly substitutable commodities for which the market demand function is linear: P = a − Q
(price as a function of quantity). Let qi denote the output of Firm i and both firms share identical
quadratic cost functions: C (qi) = (1/2) kqi, i = 0, 1, and k > 0. In the remainder of this paper,
we often refer to the public firm as Firm 0 (private firm as Firm 1) and the owner of the public
firm as Owner 0 (owner of private firm as Owner 1). The profit function of Firm i is denoted by
Πi = (a− q0 − q1)qi − 12k (qi)
2
i = 0, 1.
Social welfare, denoted by W , is measured as the sum of consumer surplus (denoted by CS) and
producer surplus (denoted by PS).
W = CS + PS,
where CS = Q2/2 and PS = Π0 + Π1. Owner 0 (the public firm’s owner) is assumed to be a
welfare maximizer, while Owner 1 (the private firm’s owner) is assumed to maximize his or her
own profit.
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3.1 Fixed Timing Games
We explore the three types of competitions considered in this paper, two Stackelberg (one is the
case of the public firm’s leader and the other is the case of the private firm’s leader) and one
Cournot duopolistic case, distinguished by the two owners’ choices of timings at which their firms
will produce.
To begin with, we consider the Cournot duopoly (denoted by superscript S) that occurs when
both the owners select the same periods with each other, i.e., the case of (t0, t1) = (1, 1) or (2, 2).
In this case, each manager independently chooses qi to maximize Vi (i = 0, 1). We obtain the
reaction function of Firm i from the first-order condition for Firm i as follows:
qi =
a− qj + θ0
2 + k
i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j. (1)
Solving the system of (??) for q0 and q1, we obtain the following equilibrium for given θi (i = 0, 1).
qSi (θ0, θ1) =
a (1 + k) + θi (2 + k)− θj
(1 + k) (3 + k)
i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j.
In the second stage, Owner 0 maximizes the reduced welfare function W
(
qSi (θ0, θ1) ; i = 0, 1
)
=
ŴS (θ0, θ1), while the objective of Owner 1 is to maximize Π̂S1 (qi (θ0, θ1) ; i = 0, 1) = Π1 (θ0, θ1).
Owner 0’s first-order condition with respect to θ0 is given as:
∂ŴS (θ0, θ1)
∂θ0
=
a (1 + k)2 − θ0
(
1 + 7k + 5k2 + k3
)− θ1 (1− 2k − k2)
(3 + 4k + k2)2
= 0, (2)
while Owner 1’s counterpart is given as:
∂Π̂S1 (θ0, θ1)
∂θ1
=
a (1 + k)− θ0 − θ1
(
4 + 10k + 6k2 + k3
)
(3 + 4k + k2)2
= 0. (3)
Solving (??) and (??) with respect to θ0 and θ1 simultaneously, we obtain the equilibrium incentive
parameter of each firm as follows:
θS∗0 =
a(1 + 5k + 4k2 + k3)
1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4
, θS∗1 =
ak (2 + k)
1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4
,
where the asterisk (∗) represents the equilibrium outcomes in each subgame. The equilibrium
incentive parameters of both Owners 0 and 1 are positive for all k > 0, and θS∗0 > θ
S∗
1 . This is
because Owner 0 cares about consumer surplus and thus tends to make his or her firm produce
aggressively. In particular, the former property is different from that seen in ?, who investigated the
case in which technologies of both the firms are represented by constant marginal cost functions,
and the public firm is less efficient than the private firm.
The equilibrium outputs, prices, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare are as follows:
qS∗0 =
a
(
1 + 6k + 5k2 + k3
)
1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4
, qS∗1 =
ak (2 + k)2
1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4
,
pS∗ =
ak
(
2 + 7k + 5k2 + k3
)
1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4
, ΠS∗0 =
a2k
(
3 + 26k + 68k2 + 74k3 + 39k4 + 10k5 + k6
)
2 (1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4)2
,
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ΠS∗1 =
a2k2 (2 + k)3
(
2 + 4k + k2
)
2 (1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4)2
, CSS∗ =
a2
(
1 + 10k + 9k2 + 2k3
)2
2 (1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4)2
,
WS∗ =
a2
(
1 + 23k + 160k2 + 308k3 + 263k4 + 113k5 + 24k6 + 2k7
)
2 (1 + 12k + 16k2 + 7k3 + k4)2
.
Next, we consider the subgame in which the manager of Firm i takes the lead (i = 0, 1). In
the market stage, by symmetry, we can confine ourselves to the case in which the manager of Firm
i takes the lead, while Firm j’s manager follows, i.e., (ti, tj) = (1, 2), (i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j). Since
the manager of Firm i takes Firm j’s reaction function qj (qi) in (??) into account, the objective
function for him or her to maximize is simplified as follows:
V̂i (qi) = Vi (qi, qj (qi)) i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j. (4)
Thus, the leader’s first-order condition is given by:
dV̂i (qi)
dqi
=
a (1 + k)− qi
(
2 + 4k + k2
)
+ θi (2 + k)− θj
2 + k
= 0,
yielding
qLi (θi, θj) =
a (1 + k) + θi (2 + k)− θj
2 + 4k + k2
i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j, (5)
where superscript L denotes the leader of the firm’s manager in outputs. Substituting (??) into
(??), we obtain the follower’s output:
qFj (θi, θj) =
a
(
1 + 3k + k2
)− θi (2 + k) + θj (3 + 4k + k2)
4 + 10k + 6k2 + k3
i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j,
where superscript F denotes the follower.
Since the objective functions of Owner 0 and 1 are different, the stage in which Owner i
independently chooses his or her incentive parameter θi is asymmetric, dependent on the order
of moves of firms’ managers (i = 0, 1). First, we consider each owner’s decision of his or her
incentive parameter in the subgame where Firm 0’s manager becomes the leader in the market
stage. Owner 0 chooses θ0 to maximize W
(
qL0 (θ0, θ1) , q
F
1 (θ0, θ1)
)
= ŴL (θ0, θ1), while Owner 1
chooses θ1 to maximize Π1
(
qL0 (θ0, θ1) , q
F
1 (θ0, θ1)
)
= Π̂F1 (θ0, θ1), independent of each other. Each
of their first-order conditions is represented as follows:
∂ŴL (θ0, θ1)
∂θ0
=
a
(
1 + 2k + 3k2 + k3
)− θ0 (2 + 15k + 17k2 + 7k3 + k4)− θ1 (1− 3k − 4k2 − k3)
(2 + k) (2 + 4k + k2)2
= 0, (6)
∂Π̂F1 (θ0, θ1)
∂θ1
=
a
(
1 + 3k + k2
)− θ0 (2 + k)− θ1 (3 + 16k + 20k2 + 8k3 + k4)
(2 + k) (2 + 4k + k2)2
= 0. (7)
Solving (??) and (??) with respect to θ0 and θ1 simultaneously, we obtain the equilibrium incentive
parameters as follows:
θL∗0 =
a
(
1 + 9k + 18k2 + 17k3 + 7k4 + k5
)
2 + 37k + 96k2 + 97k3 + 47k4 + 11k5 + k6
, θF∗1 =
ak (2 + k)2
1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5
.
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We find that the incentive parameters of both the owners are positive and θL∗0 > θ
F∗
1 , analogous
to the simultaneous-move case.
The respective values in the equilibrium are as follows:
qL∗0 =
a
(
1 + 10k + 15k2 + 7k3 + k4
)
1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5
, qF∗1 =
ak (2 + k)
(
3 + 4k + k2
)
1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5
,
pL∗ =
ak (2 + k)
(
1 + 6k + 5k2 + k3
)
1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5
,
ΠL∗0 =
a2k
(
3 + 46k + 222k2 + 438k3 + 441k4 + 250k5 + 81k6 + 14k7 + k8
)
2 (1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5)2
,
ΠF∗1 =
a2k2 (2 + k)3
(
3 + 16k + 20k2 + 8k3 + k4
)
2 (1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5)2
,
CSL∗ =
a2
(
1 + 16k + 26k2 + 13k3 + 2k4
)2
2 (1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5)2
,
WL∗ =
a2
(
1 + 35k + 378k2 + 1244k3 + 1904k4 + 1584k5 + 763k6 + 213k7 + 32k8 + 2k9
)
2 (1 + 18k + 39k2 + 29k3 + 9k4 + k5)2
.
Note that in the remainder of the paper, the equilibrium price, consumer surplus, and social welfare
are denoted by the superscript based on the move of the manager of Firm 0.
Second, we consider each owner’s decision of his or her incentive parameter in the subgame
where Firm 1 is the leader. Owner 0 chooses θ0 to maximizeW
(
qF0 (θ0, θ1) , q
L
1 (θ0, θ1)
)
= ŴF (θ0, θ1),
while Owner 1 chooses θ1 to maximize Π1
(
qF0 (θ0, θ1) , q
L
1 (θ0, θ1)
)
= Π̂L1 (θ0, θ1), independent of
each other. Each of their first-order conditions is represented as follows:
∂ŴF (θ0, θ1)
∂θ0
=
a(1+8k+12k2+6k3+k4)−θ0(1+19k+39k2+29k3+9k4+k5)−θ1(2−5k−11k2−6k3−k4)
(4+10k+6k2+k3)2
= 0, (8)
∂Π̂L (θ0, θ1)
∂θ1
= − θ1 (2 + k)
2 + 4k + k2
= 0. (9)
From (??), we directly obtain θF1 = 0 as the equilibrium incentive parameter of Firm 1. On the
other hand, substituting θF1 = 0 into (??), we obtain the equilibrium incentive parameters as
follows:
θF∗0 =
a
(
1 + 7k + 5k2 + k3
)
1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4
, θL∗1 = 0.
We find that Owner 1 sets θL∗1 = 0 independent of θ0. Since Owner 1, a profit maximizer is the
leader in the market stage, he or she cannot increase the profit of Firm 1 by adjusting his or
her incentive parameter. On the other hand, the equilibrium incentive parameter of Owner 0 is
positive, similar to the above two cases.
qF∗0 =
a
(
1 + 9k + 6k2 + k3
)
1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4
, qL∗1 =
ak
(
6 + 5k + k2
)
1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4
,
pF∗ =
ak
(
3 + 10k + 6k2 ++k3
)
1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4
, ΠF∗0 =
a2k
(
5 + 56k + 135k2 + 126k3 + 56k4 + 12k5 + k6
)
2 (1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4)2
,
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ΠF∗1 =
a2k2 (3 + k)2
(
4 + 10k + 6k2 + k3
)
2 (1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4)2
, CSF∗ =
a2
(
1 + 15k + 11k2 + 2k3
)2
2 (1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4)2
,
WF∗ =
a2
(
1 + 17k + 12k2 + 2k3
)
2 (1 + 18k + 21k2 + 8k3 + k4)
.
3.2 Equilibrium in the Observable Delay Game
In this subsection, we intend to investigate the equilibria in our observable delay game in which
the move of each firm’s manager is endogenized. For this purpose, we compare the equilibrium
market outcomes among the three subgames.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium values of three subgames are ranked as follows:
(i) θS∗0 > θ
F∗
0 > θ
L∗
0 and θ
F∗
1 > θ
S∗
1 > θ
L∗
1 .
(ii) qS∗0 > q
L∗
0 > q
F∗
0 and q
F∗
1 > q
L∗
1 > q
S∗
1 .
(iii) pF∗ > pS∗ > pL∗.
(iv) ΠF∗0 > Π
S∗
0 > Π
L∗
0 .
(v) ΠL∗1 > Π
F∗
1 ≥ ΠS∗1 , ∀k ∈ (0, 0.324929] and ΠL∗1 > ΠS∗1 > ΠF∗1 , ∀k ∈ (0.324929, ∞).
(vi) CSL∗ > CSS∗ > CSF∗ and WL∗ > WF∗ > WS∗.
If the owners directly manage their respective firms (in other words, V0 and V1 are replaced by
W and Π1, respectively), the payoff ranking of the three subgames is given as follows:
Owner 0: W˜F∗ > W˜L∗ > W˜S∗,
Owner 1:

Π˜L∗1 ≥ Π˜F∗1 > Π˜S∗1 if k ∈ (0, 0.0921936],
Π˜F∗1 > Π˜
L∗
1 > Π˜
S∗
1 if k ∈ (0.0921936,∞),
where the tilde (˜) represents the case in which there is no delegation and the firms are managed by
their owners. The ranking of Owner 0 is different from that in the introduction of the delegation.
In the no-delegation case, Owner 0 whose objective is to maximize social welfare, wishes to become
the follower in order to increase the opponent’s output and profit by reducing his or her own firm’s
output slightly. However, in the delegation case, Owner 0 desires to take the lead since he or
she cannot directly control his or her firm’s output. On the other hand, the ranking of Owner 1
also changes in the sufficiently wide interval of parameter k since the increase of Firm 1’s output
reduces its profit because of the convexity of the cost function.
Taking into account Lemma 1, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the three-stage game with managerial delegation, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibria are classified into two cases, dependent on the value of parameter k,
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(i) (t∗0, t
∗
1) = (1, 2) and (2, 1) if 0 < k ≤ 0.324929,
(ii) (t∗0, t
∗
1) = (2, 1) if k > 0.324929.
By Lemma 1, Owner 0 wishes to set his or her firm’s output in the period that is different from
that when Owner 1 does. On the other hand, the strategy of Owner 1 as the optimal reaction
against Owner 0’s strategy changes dependent on the value of k. Thus, in our model, the subgame
perfect Nash equilibria also depend on k. When the value of k is sufficiently low, k ∈ (0, 0.324929],
there are two equilibria, (t∗0, t
∗
1) = (2, 1) and (1, 2). Otherwise, (t
∗
0, t
∗
1) = (2, 1) is the unique
equilibrium. In the very wide area of k, we obtain the result that the equilibrium is unique. In
particular, the latter result is strikingly different from that in obtained ? who analyzed the case in
which the technologies of both the firms are represented by the constant marginal cost functions
and the public firm is less efficient than the private firm.
4 Product Differeniation
The next structure we consider is differentiated products mixed duopoly with linear demand and
quadratic cost. The basic structure of the model follows Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984).
On the demand side of the market, the representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic function of
two differentiated goods, q0 and q1, and a linear function of a numeraire good, q.
U = a (q0 + q1)− 12
[
(q0)
2 + 2bq0q1 + (q1)
2
]
+ q, b ∈ (0, 1) .
where the parameter b measures the degree of product differentiation. The utility function implies
the system of linear demand functions:
qi =
a (1− b)− pi + bpj
1− b2 , i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j.
Under the condition of b < 1, these direct demand functions can be inverted to obtain
pi = a− qi − bqj , i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j.
We assume that the technologies of both the firms are specified by the quadratic functions with
respect to their own outputs, i.e., (qi)
2 (i = 0, 1). Note that in the context of mixed duopoly with
both of homogeneous and differentiated goods, this type of cost function is used in ? and ?. The
profit function of Firm i is given by:
Πi = (a− qi − bqj) qi − (qi)2 ,
=
[a (−1 + b) + pi − bpj ]
[
a (1− b)− (2− b2) pi + bpj]
(1− b2)2 , i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j.
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Social welfare is defined by the sum of consumer surplus (denoted by CS) and producer surplus
(denoted by PS). The producer surplus is represented by PS = Π0 + Π1, while the consumer
surplus is denoted as:
CS =
1
2
[
(q0)
2 + 2bq0q1 + (q1)
2
]
,
=
2a2 (1− b) + (p0)2 − 2bp0p1 + (p1)2 − 2a (1− b) (p0 + p1)
2 (1− b2) .
Thus, Social welfare W is indicated by
W = CS + PS.
4.1 Price Competition
In this subsection, we consider a model of differentiated products mixed duopoly wherein the firms
compete in terms of prices. To begin with, we consider the simultaneous-move game of firms’
managers. Given the incentive parameters of both the firms, from the maximization problem of
each firm’s manager, we obtain the reaction function of Firm i as follows:
pi =
a
(
3− 3b− b2 + b3)+ bpj (3− b2)− θi (1− b2)
2 (2− b2) , i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j, (10)
yielding
pSi =
a
(
12− 3b− 7b2 + b3 + b4)− 2θi (2− b2)− bθj (3− b2)
16− 9b2 + b4 , i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j.
In the second stage, Owner 1 maximizes W (pi (θ0, θ1) ; i = 0, 1) = ŴS (θ0, θ1), while the objec-
tive of Owner 1 is to maximize Π (pi (θ0, θ1) ; i = 0, 1) = Π̂ (θ0, θ1). Solving these two problems
simultaneously, we obtain the equilibrium incentive parameters of both the firms as follows:
θS0 =
a
(
64− 32b− 96b2 + 36b3 + 39b4 − 11b5 − 5b6 + b7)
192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6 ,
θS1 = −
ab2
(
36− 12b− 21b2 + 7b3 + 3b4 − b5)
192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6 .
The equilibrium incentive parameter of Owner 1 is negative for any b ∈ (0, 1), whereas that of
Owner 0 is positive in the wide area of b (0 < b < 0.91131). Owner 1 aims to maximize his or
her own profit, and thus, he or she attempts to raise his or her price by reducing the incentive
parameter. On the other hand, Owner 0 takes consumer surplus into consideration, since his or
her objective is to maximize social welfare. Accordingly, Owner 0 reduces his or her price by
increasing the incentive parameter. However, when the value of b is very high (in other words,
each of the two goods produced by Firms 0 and 1 is nearly homogeneous), Owner 0 attempts to
maintain a certain level of his or her price by decreasing the incentive parameter, since intense
price competition results in excessive decrease in producer surplus.
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In this case, the respective values in the equilibrium are as follows:
qS∗0 =
a
(
64− 20b− 36b2 + 10b3 + 5b4 − b5)
192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6 , q
S∗
1 =
a (3− b) (4− b2)2
192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6 ,
pS∗0 =
2a
(
64− 14b− 38b2 + 7b3 + 6b4 − b5)
192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6 , p
S
1 =
4a
(
36− 12b− 21b2 + 7b3 + 3b4 − b5)
192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6 ,
ΠS∗0 =
a2
(
4096− 1792b− 4704b2 + 1984b3 + 2084b4 − 852b5 − 384b6 + 166b7 + 21b8 − 12b9 + b10)
(192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6)2 ,
ΠS1 =
a2 (3− b)2 (4− b2)3 (8− 3b2)
(192− 128b2 + 25b4 − b6)2 ,
CSS∗ =
a2(3200+1024b−5112b2−816b3+3120b4+164b5−914b6+22b7+129b8−11b9−7b10+b11)
(192−128b2+25b4−b6)2
,
WS∗ =
a2(11904−3840b−14488b2+4624b3+6752b4−2128b5−1454b6+452b7+133b8−41b9−3b10+b11)
(192−128b2+25b4−b6)2
.
Next, we consider the subgame in which the manager of Firm i takes the lead (i = 0, 1). The
manager of Firm i chooses the value of pi that maximizes V̂i (pi) = Vi (pi, pj (pi)), taking into
account (??) (i, j = 0, 1; i 6= j). Solving this problem, we obtain:
pLi =
2a
(
12− 3b− 7b2 + b3 + b4)− θi (8− 6b2 + b4)− 2bθj (3− b2)
32− 20b2 + 3b4 , i, j = 0, 1 ; i 6= j.
Furthermore, we obtain the equilibrium follower’s price as follows:
pFj =
a
(
48− 12b− 31b2 + 7b3 + 5b4 − b5)− bθi (12 + 7b2 − b4)− θj (16− 9b2 + b4)
64− 40b2 + 6b4 ,
j = 0, 1; j 6= i.
Since the objectives of Owners 0 and 1 are different (in other words, the objective of Owner 0
is to maximize social welfare, while that of Owner 1 is to maximize his or her own profit), the two
subgames in which the manager of Firm i takes the lead are asymmetric (i = 0, 1). Thus, in the
remainder of this section, we must consider the two subgames as different ones. First, we consider
each owner’s determination of his or her incentive parameter in the subgame where the manager
of Firm 0 takes the lead. Each owner i chooses the value of θi, taking both of the firms’ prices in
the market stage into account (i = 0, 1). We obtain the equilibrium incentive parameters of both
the owners as follows:
θL∗0 =
a
(
1024− 512b− 1088b2 + 496b3 + 380b4 − 153b5 − 47b6 + 15b7 + b8)
3072− 3008b2 + 1076b4 − 165b6 + 9b8 ,
θF∗1 = −
4ab2
(
36− 12b− 21b2 + 7b3 + 3b4 − b5)
768− 560b2 + 129b4 − 9b6 .
The equilibrium incentive parameter of Owner 1 is negative, while that of Owner 0 is positive for
any b ∈ (0, 1). The behavior of Owner 1 is the same as that obtained in the simultaneous-move
case. On the other hand, since the manager of Firm 0 takes the lead in this case, Owner 0 always
keeps the incentive parameter positive in order to make his or her own firm’s price low and to
increase consumer surplus, regardless of what the value of b is.
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In this case, we obtain the equilibrium market outcomes as follows:
qL∗0 =
a
(
256− 80b− 160b2 + 45b3 + 28b4 − 6b5 − b6)
768− 560b2 + 129b4 − 9b6 , q
F∗
1 =
a (3− b) (4− b2) (16− 5b2)
768− 560b2 + 129b4 − 9b6 ,
pL∗0 =
a
(
512− 112b− 336b2 + 63b3 + 65b4 − 9b5 − 3b6)
768− 560b2 + 129b4 − 9b6 ,
pF∗1 =
a
(
4− b2) (144− 48b− 57b2 + 19b3 + 3b4 − b5)
768− 560b2 + 129b4 − 9b6 ,
ΠL∗0 =
a2(65536−28672b−83456b2+35328b3+41920b4−16960b5−10374b6+3897b7+1289b8−414b9−75b10+15b11+2b12)
(768−560b2+129b4−9b6)2
,
ΠF∗1 =
a2
(
12− 4b− 3b2 + b3)2 (512− 384b2 + 86b4 − 5b6)
(768− 560b2 + 129b4 − 9b6)2 ,
CSL∗ =
a2(102400+32768b−176384b2−30208b3+119024b4+7904b5−39879b6+336b7+6819b8−402b9−527b10+42b11+11b12)
2(768−560b2+129b4−9b6)2
,
WL∗ =
a2(380928−122880b−511232b2+163328b3+271664b4−85536b5−71443b6+21954b7+9361b8−2742b9−515b10+132b11+5b12)
2(768−560b2+129b4−9b6)2
.
Second, we consider the subgame in which the manager of Firm 1 becomes the leader. Similar
to the case in which the manager of Firm 0 is the leader, we obtain the equilibrium incentive
parameters of both the owners as follows:
θF∗0 =
a
(
256− 128b− 400b2 + 164b3 + 173b4 − 61b5 − 23b6 + 7b7)
768− 560b2 + 123b4 − 7b6 , θ
L∗
1 = 0.
By analogy to the competition with homogeneous goods, when the manager of Firm 1 becomes the
leader in the ensuing market stage, Owner 1 decides that it is optimal not to allow any further price
increase. With regard to Owner 0, similar to the simultaneous-move case, his or her equilibrium
incentive parameter is positive in the wide interval of b (0 < b < 0.925761).
The equilibrium market outcomes are obtained as follows:
qF∗0 =
a
(
256− 80b− 160b2 + 48b3 + 25b4 − 7b5)
768− 560b2 + 123b4 − 7b6 , q
L∗
1 =
a
(
192− 64b− 108b2 + 36b3 + 15b4 − 5b5)
768− 560b2 + 123b4 − 7b6 ,
pF∗0 =
2a
(
256− 56b− 168b2 + 30b3 + 31b4 − 4b5 − b6)
768− 560b2 + 123b4 − 7b6 ,
pL∗1 =
4a
(
144− 48b− 93b2 + 31b3 + 15b4 − 5b5)
768− 560b2 + 123b4 − 7b6 ,
ΠF∗0 =
a2(65536−28672b−83456b2+34560b3+41536b4−16176b5−9952b6+3628b7+1113b8−380b9−43b10+14b11)
(768−560b2+123b4−7b6)2
,
ΠL∗1 =
a2
(
48− 16b− 15b2 + 5b3)2 (32− 20b2 + 3b4)2
(768− 560b2 + 123b4 − 7b6)2 ,
CSF∗ =
a2(51200+16384b−88192b2−14336b3+59080b4+2688b5−19308b6+876b7+3085b8−367b9−193b10+35b11)
(768−560b2+123b4−7b6)2
,
WF∗ =
a2
(
248− 80b− 152b2 + 48b3 + 23b4 − 7b5)
768− 560b2 + 123b4 − 7b6 .
By comparing the equilibrium market outcomes in the above three subgames, the following
results are obtained.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium values of the three subgames are ranked as follows:
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(i) θL∗0 > θ
F∗
0 > θ
S∗
0 and θ
L∗
1 > θ
S∗
1 > θ
F∗
1 .
(ii) qF∗0 > q
L∗
0 > q
S∗
0 and q
S∗
1 > q
L∗
1 > q
F∗
1 .
(iii) pL∗0 > p
S∗
0 > p
F∗
0 and p
F∗
1 > p
S∗
1 > p
L∗
1 .
(iv) ΠL∗0 > Π
S∗
0 > Π
F∗
0 and Π
F∗
1 > Π
S∗
1 > Π
L∗
1 .
(v) CSF∗ > CSS∗ > CSL∗ and WF∗ > WS∗ > WL∗.
The ranking of the equilibrium incentive parameters and market outcomes are the same as
those in Nakamura and Inoue (2007) who considered the case in which technologies of both the
firms are represented by constant marginal cost functions. Thus, in the context of the observable
delay game of a price-setting mixed duopoly with managerial delegation, we find that the results
are robust against the cost conditions of both the firms. The rank orders of the equilibrium profits
of both the firms are identical to those of the corresponding prices, whereas in consumer surplus
and social welfare, the rankings are inverted.
Proposition 2. In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, (t∗0, t
∗
1) = (2, 2).
By Lemma 2, Owners 0 and 1 want to set their firms’ prices after his or her opponent does.
Thus, we obtain the result that it is a dominant strategy for each firm to set price at t = 2. Owner
0 prefers the case in which lower prices are observed since he or she wants to increase consumer
surplus, while Owner 1 wishes to realize higher prices. Therefore, the pair of each owner’s strategy,
(t0, t1) = (2, 2), is the dominant strategy for each owner, resulting in the pair of equilibrium
strategy in this model.
4.2 Quantity Competition
In this subsection, we consider differentiated products quantity competition with linear demand
and quadratic cost. Analogous to the price competition, the following analysis proceeds. In the
subgame in which each of the managers of the firms simultaneously chooses his or her output, the
equilibrium incentive parameters are as follows:
θS∗0 =
a
(
8− 4b+ b2)
24− b2 , θ
S∗
1 =
4ab2 (3− b)
192− 32b2 + b4 .
We find that θS∗i > 0 (i = 0, 1), and θ
S∗
0 > θ
S∗
1 for any b ∈ (0, 1). As is mentioned above, the latter
result shows that Owner 0 wishes to expand output more aggressively than Owner 1 because of
the difference of their objectives.
The equilibrium market outcomes are as follows:
qS∗0 =
a
(
64− 20b− 4b2 + b3)
192− 32b2 + b4 , q
S∗
1 =
16a (3− b)
192− 32b2 + b4 ,
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pS∗0 =
a
(
128− 28b− 12b2 − b3 + b4)
192− 32b2 + b4 , p
S∗
1 =
4a
(
36− 12b− 3b2 + b3)
192− 32b2 + b4 ,
ΠS∗0 =
a2
(
4096− 1792b− 608b2 + 128b3 + 128b4 − 20b5 − 6b6 + b7)
(192− 32b2 + b4)2 ,
ΠS∗1 =
64a2 (3− b)2
(24− b2)2 (8− b2) , CS
S∗ =
a2
(
6400 + 2048b− 3824b2 + 544b3 + 200b4 − 40b5 + b6)
2 (192− 32b2 + b4)2 ,
WS∗ =
a2
(
23808− 7680b− 5168b2 + 1568b3 + 328b4 − 80b5 − 11b6 + 2b7)
2 (192− 32b2 + b4)2 .
Second, we consider the subgame in which the manager of Firm 0 becomes the leader. In this
case, the equilibrium incentive parameters are as follows:
θL∗0 =
a
(
1024− 512b− 320b2 + 176b3 + 12b4 − 9b5)
4 (768− 176b2 + 9b4) , θ
F∗
1 =
16ab2 (3− b)
768− 176b2 + 9b4 . (11)
Similar to the simultaneous-move case, we find that θL∗0 , θ
F∗
1 > 0, and θ
L∗
0 > θ
F∗
1 for any b ∈ (0, 1).
In this case, taking the values of θL∗0 and θ
F∗
1 into account, we obtain the equilibrium values in
the market as follows:
qL∗0 =
a
(
256− 80b− 32b2 + 9b3)
768− 176b2 + 9b4 , q
F∗
1 =
4a (3− b) (16− b2)
768− 176b2 + 9b4 ,
pL∗0 =
a
(
512− 112b− 80b2 + 3b3 + 5b4)
768− 176b2 + 9b4 ,
pF∗1 =
4a
(
144− 48b− 21b2 + 7b3)
768− 176b2 + 9b4 ,
ΠL∗0 =
a2
(
65536− 28672b− 17920b2 + 5632b3 + 3008b4 − 640b5 − 214b6 + 45b7)
(768− 176b2 + 9b4)2 ,
ΠF∗1 =
32a2 (3− b)2 (256− 64b2 + 3b4)
(768− 176b2 + 9b4)2 ,
CSL∗ =
a2 (4− b)2 (6400 + 5248b− 2400b2 − 1240b3 + 201b4 + 72b5)
2 (768− 176b2 + 9b4)2 ,
WL∗ =
a2
(
380928− 122880b− 130304b2 + 40448b3 + 14384b4 − 4128b5 − 611b6 + 162b7)
2 (768− 176b2 + 9b4)2 .
Finally, we consider the subgame in which the manager of Firm 1 is the leader. In this case,
we obtain the incentive parameters of the both the firms as follows:
θF∗0 =
a
(
256− 128b− 16b2 + 20b3 − 3b4)
768− 176b2 + 11b4 , θ
L∗
1 = 0.
By analogy to the above two settings (the quantity competition with homogeneous goods and price
competition with differentiated goods) that the manager of Firm 1 takes the lead, we recognize
that θL∗1 = 0. Moreover, we recognize that θ
F∗
0 > 0.
The equilibrium values in the market outcomes are obtained as follows:
qF∗0 =
a
(
256− 80b− 32b2 + 8b3 + b4)
768− 176b2 + 11b4 , q
L∗
1 =
4a
(
48− 16b− 3b2 + b3)
768− 176b2 + 11b4 ,
pF∗0 =
2a
(
256− 56b− 40b2 + 2b3 + 3b4)
768− 176b2 + 11b4 , p
L∗
1 =
a
(
576− 192b− 84b2 + 28b3 + 3b4 − b5)
768− 176b2 + 11b4 ,
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ΠF∗0 =
a2
(
65536− 28672b− 17920b2 + 5888b3 + 3136b4 − 688b5 − 240b6 + 36b7 + 5b8)
(768− 176b2 + 11b4)2 ,
ΠL∗1 =
4a2
(
8− b2) (48− 16b− 3b2 + b3)2
(768− 176b2 + 11b4)2 ,
CSF∗ =
a2
(
102400 + 32768b− 73984b2 + 4096b3 + 11024b4 − 1280b5 − 560b6 + 56b7 + 9b8)
2 (768− 176b2 + 11b4)2 ,
WF∗ =
a2
(
496− 160b− 56b2 + 16b3 + b4)
1536− 352b2 + 22b4 .
We obtain the following ranking orders based on the equilibrium values of several variables in
the three subgames.
Lemma 3. The equilibrium values of the three subgames are ranked as follows:
(i) θS∗0 > θ
F∗
0 > θ
L∗
0 and θ
F∗
1 > θ
S∗
1 > θ
L∗
1 .
(ii) qS∗0 > q
L∗
0 > q
F∗
0 and q
F∗
1 > q
L∗
1 > q
S∗
1 .
(iii) pF∗0 > p
S∗
0 > p
L∗
0 and p
L∗
1 > p
S∗
1 > p
F∗
1 .
(iv) ΠF∗0 > Π
S∗
0 > Π
L∗
0 and Π
L∗
1 > Π
S∗
1 > Π
F∗
1 .
(v) CSL∗ > CSS∗ > CSF∗ and WL∗ > WF∗ > WS∗.
When the cost functions of both of the firms are quadratic in the quantity-setting mixed duopoly
with differentiated goods, the rankings of all equilibrium market outcomes are the same as those
in the competition with homogeneous goods when k > 0.324929. Thus, the intuition of Lemma 3
is almost unchanged with that of Lemma 1 in the case of k > 0.324929.
Proposition 3. In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, (t∗0, t
∗
1) = (2, 1).
Since, given the strategy of Owner 0, the optimal reaction of Owner 1 is clear, there exists a
unique equilibrium in this case, different from the one that exists in the competition with homo-
geneous goods. Note that the dominant strategy of Owner 1 is t1 = 1, i.e., to move as soon an
possible.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined a model in which a public firm and a private firm set their own outputs
or prices sequentially or simultaneously in the various environments, focusing on the managerial
delegation of the firms. In particular, we consider the case in which technologies of both the
firms are represented by the quadratic cost functions, whereas Nakamura and Inoue (2007b, 2007c)
assumed that the cost functions of both the firms are linear. In the case of the quantity competition
with homogeneous goods, we showed that in equilibrium, the public firm tends to become the
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follower under the moderate condition. Moreover, in the quantity competition with differentiated
goods, we found that in equilibrium the public firm is certainly the follower under the somewhat
strong cost condition. These two results are in contrast to that in ?. Furthermore, in the price
competition with differentiated goods, we showed that both the firms choose their prices as late
as possible under the same cost condition as in the quantity competition. This result coincides
with that in ?. Thus, in the analysis on the mixed duopoly with managerial delegation, using
the observable delay game in ?, we can say that in price competition, the equilibrium structure of
competition is robust against changes in production technologies of both the firms, while in quantity
competition, the equilibrium competition structure is changed due to forms of the technologies of
them.
Finally, we must accept the fact that our model is restrictive. We considered the situation in
which the production technologies of both the public firm and private firm are symmetric, i.e., they
are represented by identical quadratic cost functions. Whether all results we derived in this paper
survive under the asymmetric situation with regard to the production efficiencies of both the firms
needs to be explored. Moreover, our analysis is limited to duopoly and the case in which there
exist only two periods that firms’ owners can select based on their decisions of when the necessary
action should be taken. The preceding researches such as Pal (1998) and Lu (2006) explored the
endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly where firms select the timing from n ≥ 2 periods. These
issues will dealt with in future research.
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